The system of judgment of repetitive cases from the perspective of the principle of speed

Abstract

This article is intended to assess, through the study of the legislation in force and analysis of tried cases, whether the system created by the legislator in the civil procedural law is able to meet the procedural speed imposed by the Federal Constitution. At first, the idea of judging more cases in less time is undeniably a consecration of the constitutional guarantee, but the legislation is not entirely perfect. It should be said that particularities commonly arise in issues presented to the Judiciary, and that presenting subjectivism in uniforms that should be objective as far as possible renders ineffective the institute itself created. In addition to procedural mechanisms, there is also the use of algorithm-based artificial intelligence that can decrease the repetitive work of judicial services, however, if not improved and supervised, it is able to misguided by correlating theses to the concrete cases analyzed. Therefore, the work presented here analyzes the judgment of repetitive demands under the theoretical and practical approach, so that it can be concluded whether there is a reduction of time in the judicial activity or if it is still necessary to improve the tools available.